In many applications, it is desirable to work with signatures that are both short, and yet where many messages from different signers be verified very quickly. RSA signatures satisfy the latter condition, but are generally thousands of bits in length. Recent developments in pairingbased cryptography produced a number of "short" signatures which provide equivalent security in a fraction of the space. Unfortunately, verifying these signatures is computationally intensive due to the expensive pairing operation. In an attempt to simultaneously achieve "short and fast" signatures, Camenisch, Hohenberger and Pedersen (Eurocrypt 2007) showed how to batch verify two pairing-based schemes so that the total number of pairings was independent of the number of signatures to verify.
Introduction
As we move into the era of pervasive computing, where computers are everywhere as an integrated part of our surroundings, there are going to be a host of devices exchanging messages with each other, e.g., sensor networks, vehicle-2-vehicle communications [14, 36] . For these systems to work properly, messages must carry some form of authentication, but the system requirements on the authentication are particularly demanding. Any cryptographic solution must simultaneously be:
1. Short: Bandwidth is an issue. Raya and Hubaux argue that due to the limited spectrum available for vehicular communication, something shorter than RSA signatures is needed [34] . was the best method known to us. Recently, Law and Matt [24] proposed three new techniques for finding invalid signatures in a batch. One of their techniques allows to save approximately half the time needed by the simple divide-and-conquer approach, for large batch sizes. Thus, while our numbers seem good, they can be further improved.
Overall, we conclude that many interesting short signatures can be batch verified, and that batch verification is an extremely valuable tool for system implementors. As an example of our results in section 5, for the short group signatures of Boneh, Boyen and Shacham [6] , we see that when batching 200 group signatures (in a 160-bit MNT curve) individual verification takes 139ms whereas batch verification reduces the cost to 25ms per signature (see Figure 1 ).
Algebraic Setting: Pairings
Let PSetup be an algorithm that, on input the security parameter 1 τ , outputs the parameters for a bilinear pairing as (q, g 1 , g 2 , G 1 , G 2 , G T , e), where G 1 = g 1 , G 2 = g 2 and G T are of prime order q ∈ Θ(2 τ ). The efficient mapping e : G 1 × G 2 → G T is both: (bilinear) for all g ∈ G 1 , h ∈ G 2 and a, b ← Z q , e(g a , h b ) = e(g, h) ab ; and (non-degenerate) if g generates G 1 and h generates G 2 , then e(g, h) = 1. This is called the asymmetric setting. A specialized case is the symmetric setting, where G 1 = G 2 . We will always write group elements in the multiplicative notation, although the groups G 1 and G 2 are actually implemented as additive groups.
Since we are looking at various schemes based on these groups, we are interested in groups that have the smallest representation of the group elements, we want to know if schemes in the symmetric setting can be moved over to the asymmetric setting and finally want to be able to verify whether a given element is a member of a specific group.
Size of Group Elements
Pairings are constructed such that G 1 and G 2 are groups of points on some elliptic curve E, and G T is a subgroup of a multiplicative group over a related finite field. All groups have order q.
The group of points on E defined over F p is written as E(F p ). Usually it is the case that G 1 is a subgroup of E(F p ), G 2 is a subgroup of E(F p k ) where k is the embedding degree, and G T is a subgroup of F * p k . In the symmetric case G 1 = G 2 is usually a subgroup of E(F p ). In the following, we use numbers for security comparable to 1024 bit RSA. The MOV attack by Menezes, Vanstone and Okamoto states that solving the discrete logarithm problem on a curve reduces to solving it over the corresponding finite field [27] . Hence the size of p k must be comparable to that of an RSA modulus to provide the same level of security, so elements of F p k must be of size 1024. But the size of the finite field is not the only thing that matters for security. The group order q must also be large enough to resist the Pollard-ρ attack on discrete logarithms, which means that q ≥ 160. Now assume that |p| = |q| = 160, then we would need an embedding degree k = 6 to get the size of the corresponding field close to the required 1024 bits. However, we could also let |q| = 160, |p| = 512, and choose k = 2 to achieve the same. Both these options have their advantages and disadvantages as discussed by Koblitz and Menezes [23] .
We have talked about how many bits are required to represent elements in the finite fields, but what about the groups G 1 and G 2 ? Since they are subgroups of a curve over the field, they are represented by their coordinates (x, y) which are elements of the field, and hence one would expect their size to be twice the size of an element in the field. However one only needs to represent x and the LSB of y in order to recompute y later. Also, in some cases (when G 2 is the trace zero subgroup) elements of G 2 can be represented as elements of the field E(F p k/2 ) instead, which would only require half the space [23] .
In the asymmetric setting, the best we can hope for are group elements in G 1 , G 2 and G T of size 160, 512 and 1024 bits respectively. In the symmetric setting it seems the best curve is a supersingular curve with k = 2, which means that elements of G 1 = G 2 and G T will be of size 512 and 1024 bits respectively. Finally, an important thing to keep in mind is that no matter the order of the groups, performance is dominated by the operations in the underlying finite field.
From Symmetric to Asymmetric
If one wants to go from the symmetric to the asymmetric setting to take advantage of the small group elements in G 1 , there are a few pitfalls one should be aware of. In some asymmetric groups it is not possible to hash into G 2 , but in these groups there exist a isomorphism from G 2 to G 1 . In other groups there is no such isomorphism, but it is possible to hash into G 2 . So if a scheme requires both for the security proof, that scheme cannot be realized in the asymmetric setting. See Galbraith, Paterson and Smart [20] for more.
Testing Membership
Our proofs will require that elements of purported signatures are members of G 1 , but how efficiently can this fact be verified? Determining whether some data represents a point on a curve is easy. The question is whether it is in the correct subgroup. Assume that the subgroup has order q. The easy way to verify if y ∈ G 1 is simply to test y q = 1. Since q might be quite large this test is inefficient, but as we will see later the time required to test membership of group elements are insignificant compared to the time required to do the pairings in the applications we have in mind. Yet, in some cases, there are more efficient ways to test group membership [18] .
Let us begin with a formal definition of pairing based batch verifier. Recall that PSetup is an algorithm that, on input the security parameter 1 τ , outputs the parameters (q, g 1 , g 2 , G 1 , G 2 , G T , e), where G 1 , G 2 , G T are of prime order q ∈ Θ(2 τ ). Pairing-based verification equation are represented by a generic pairing based claim X corresponding to a boolean relation of the following form:
= A, for k ∈ poly(τ ) and f i ∈ G 1 , h i ∈ G 2 and c i ∈ Z * q , for each i = 1, . . . , k. A pairing-based verifier Verify for a generic pairing-based claim is a probabilistic poly(τ )-time algorithm which on input the representation A, f 1 , . . . , f k , h 1 , . . . , h k , c 1 , . . . , c k of a claim X, outputs accept if X holds and reject otherwise. We define a batch verifier for pairing-based claims.
, where η ∈ poly(τ ), let X (j) be a generic pairing-based claim and let Verify be a pairing based verifier. We define a pairing-based batch verifier for Verify as a probabilistic poly(τ )-time algorithm which outputs:
• reject if X (j) does not hold for any j ∈ [1, η] except with negligible probability.
Small Exponents Test Applied to Pairings
Bellare, Garay and Rabin proposed methods for verifying multiple equations of the form y i = g x i for i = 1 to n, where g is a generator for a group of prime order [4] . One might be tempted to just multiply these equations together and check if
x i . However, it would be easy to produce two pairs (x 1 , y 1 ) and (x 2 , y 2 ) such that the product of them verifies correctly, but each individual verification does not, e.g. by submitting the pairs (x 1 − α, y 1 ) and (x 2 + α, y 2 ) for any α. Instead, Bellare et al. proposed the following method, which we will later apply to pairings.
Small Exponents Test:
Choose exponents δ i of (a small number of) b bits and compute
x i δ i . Then the probability of accepting a bad pair is 2 − b . The size of b is a tradeoff between efficiency and security. (In Section 5, we set b = 80 bits.)
where q is prime. For each j ∈ [1, η], where η ∈ poly(τ ), let X (j) corresponds to a generic claim as in Definition 3.2. For simplicity, assume that X (j) is of the form A ? = Y (j) where A is fixed for all j and all the input values to the claim X (j) are in the correct groups. For any random vector ∆ = (δ 1 , . . . , δ η ) of b bit elements from Z q , an algorithm Batch which tests the following equation
is a pairing-based batch verifier that accepts an invalid batch with probability at most 2 − b .
Proof. The proof closely follows the proof of the small exponents test by Bellare et al. [4] , but for completeness we include a full proof of this theorem in Appendix A. 1 2 Thus, Theorem 3.2 provides a single verification equation, which we then want to optimize.
1 A natural question to ask is if this batch verifier also works for composite order groups. Unfortunately the answer is not straightforward. The reason for requiring a prime order group, is that for the proof of the small exponents test to go through, we need an element β1 to have an inverse in Zq, which is the case if gcd(β1, q) = 1. If q is prime this is always the case, but what if q is composite? If q = p1p2, where p1, p2 are primes, then this is the case except when β1 is a multiple of p1, p2 or q. If β1 is chosen at random it is very unlikely that an inverse does not exist, and the small exponents test will work in almost all cases. However, this really depends on the signature scheme, so if one wants to apply this method to a scheme set in a composite order group, one should examine the proof in Appendix A and make sure that it still applies to the chosen scheme.
Basic Batching Techniques
Armed with Theorem 3.2, let's back up for a moment to get a complete picture of how to develop an efficient batch verifier. This summarizes the ideas we used to obtain the results in Figure 2 , which we believe will be useful elsewhere. Immediately after the summary, we'll explain the details. Technique 1 Change the verification equation. Recall that a Σ-protocol is a three step protocol (commit, challenge, response) allowing a prover to prove various statements to a verifier. Using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic a Σ-protocol can be turned into a signature scheme, by forming the challenge as the hash of the commitment and the message to be signed. The signature is then either (commit, response) or (challenge, response). The latter is often preferred, since the challenge is usually smaller than the commitment, which results in a smaller signature. However, we observed that this often causes batch verification to become very inefficient, whereas using (commit, response) results in a much more suitable verification equation.
We use this technique to help batch the Hess IBS [22] and the group signatures of Boneh, Boyen and Shacham [6] and Boyen and Shacham [10] . Indeed, we believe that prior attempts to batch verify group signatures overlooked this idea and thus came up without efficient solutions.
Combination
Step: Given η pairing-based claims, apply Theorem 3.2 to obtain a single equation. The combination step actually consist of two substeps:
1. Check Membership: Check that all elements are in the correct subgroup. Only elements that could be generated by an adversary needs to be checked (e.g., elements of a signature one wants to verify). Public parameters need not be checked, or could be checked only once. 2. Small Exponents Test: Combine all equations into one and apply the small exponents test.
Next, optimize this single equation using any of the following techniques in any order.
Technique 2 Move the exponent into the pairing. When a pairing of the form e(g i , h i ) δ i appears, move the exponent δ i into e(). Since elements of G are usually smaller than elements of G T , this gives a small speedup when computing the exponentiation.
Remember that it is also possible to move an exponent out of the pairing, or move it between the two elements of the pairing. In some cases, this allows for further optimizations.
Technique 3 When two pairings with a common first or second element appear, they can be combined. This can reduce η pairings to one. It will work like this:
When batching η instances using Theorem 3.2 this will reduce η pairings to one. This is also worth keeping in mind when designing schemes, or picking schemes that one wants to batch verify. Pick a scheme so that when e(g, h) appears in the verification equation, g or h is fixed. In rare cases, it might be useful to apply this technique "in reverse", e.g., splitting a single pairing into two or more pairings to allow for the application of other techniques. For example, we do this when batching Boyen's ring signatures [11] , so that we can apply Technique 4 below.
Technique 4 Waters hash. In his IBE, Waters described how hash identities to values in G 1 [38] , using a technique that was subsequently employed in several signature schemes. Assume the identity is a bit string V = v 1 v 2 . . . v m , then given public parameters u 1 , . . . , u m , u ∈ G 1 , the hash is u
Following works by Naccache [30] and Chatterjee and Sarkar [16, 17] documented the generalization where instead of evaluating the identity bit by bit, divide the k bit identity bit string into z blocks, and then hash. (In Section 5, we SHA1 hash our messages to a 160-bit string, and use z = 5 as proposed in [30] .) Recently, Camenisch et al. [13] pointed out the following method:
In this work, we apply this technique to schemes with structures related to the Waters hash; namely, the ring signatures of Boyen [11] and the aggregate signatures of Lu et al. [25] .
Handling Invalid Signatures
If there is even a single invalid signature in the batch, then the batch verifier will reject the entire batch with high probability. In many real-world situations, a signature collection may contain invalid signatures caused by accidental data corruption, or possibly malicious activity by an adversary seeking to degrade service. The ratio of invalid signatures to valid could be quite small, and yet a standard batch verifier will reject the entire collection. In some cases, this may not be a serious concern. E.g., sensor networks with a high level of redundancy may choose to simply drop messages that cannot be efficiently verified. Alternatively, systems may be able to cache and/or individually verify important messages when batch verification fails. Yet, in some applications, it might be critical to tolerate some percentage of invalid signatures without losing the performance advantage of batch verification. In Section 5.2, we employ a recursive divide-and-conquer approach, similar to that of Pastuszak, Pieprzyk, Michalek and Seberry [32] , as: First, shuffle the incoming batch of signatures, and if batch verification fails, simply divide the collection into two halves, and recurse on the halves. When this process terminates, the batch verifier outputs the index of each invalid signature. Through careful implementation and caching of intermediate results, much of the work of the batch verification (i.e., computing the product of many signature elements) can be performed once over the full signature collection, and need not be repeated when verifying each sub-collection. Thus, the cost of each recursion is dominated by the number of pairings used in the batch verification algorithm. In Section 5.2, we show that even if up to 15% of the signatures are invalid, this technique still performs faster than individual verification.
Recently, Law and Matt [24] proposed three new techniques for finding invalid signatures in a batch. One of their techniques, which is the most efficient for large batch sizes, allows to save approximately half the time needed by the simple divide-and-conquer approach. Thus, it is possible to do even better than the performance numbers we present. 
Figure 2: Signatures with Efficient Batch Verifiers. Let η be the number of signatures to verify, s be the number of distinct signers involved and be either the size of a ring or the size of an aggregate. Boyen batch verifier requires each signature to be issued according to the same ring. Aggregate verifiers work for signatures related to the same set of users. In CHP, only signatures from the same time period can be batched and z is a (small) parameter (e.g., 8). In LOSSW, k is the message bit-length. RO stands for random oracle.
Batch Verifiers for Short Signatures
We now show how to batch verify a selection of existing regular, identity-based, group, ring, and aggregate signature schemes. To our knowledge, these are the first such verifiers for group, ring and aggregate signatures. After a search through the existing literature, we are presenting only the schemes with the best results (although we often note common schemes that do not appear to batch well.) Figure 2 shows a summary of our results.
Short Group Signatures
The short group signatures of Boneh, Boyen and Shacham (BBS) [6] and Boneh and Shacham (BS) [10] do not appear to batch well without making some alterations in both the signatures and their verification equations. We show how to do this to achieve a batch verifier which requires only 2 pairings at the cost of a small increase in the signature size.
Recall that a group signature scheme allows any member to sign on behalf of the group in such a way that anyone can verify a signature using the group public key while nobody, but the group manager, can identify the actual signer. A group signature scheme consists in four algorithm: KeyGen, Sign, Verify and Open, that, respectively generate public and private keys for users and the group manager, sign a message on behalf of a group, verify the signature on a message according to the group and trace a signature to a signer. For our purposes, we focus on the verification algorithm.
, where H : {0, 1} * → Z q is a hash function and there exists an efficiently-computable isomorphism ψ : G 2 → G 1 . Let be the number of users in a group.
The BBS scheme requires a computable isomorphism ψ : G 2 → G 1 since their definition of the SDH assumption is based on it, but such an isomorphism does not exist for the MNT curves we use in Section 5. Boneh and Boyen recently gave a definition which doesn't require said isomorphism [5] .
KeyGen. The group manager sets the keys as:
The public key is gpk = (g 1 , g 2 , h, u, v, w), the group manager's secret key is gmsk = (r 1 , r 2 ) and the secret key of the i'th user is
Sign. Given a group public key gpk = (g 1 , g 2 , h, u, v, w), a user private key (f, x) and a message M ∈ {0, 1} * , compute the signature σ as follows:
Verify. Given a group public key gpk = (g 1 , g 2 , h, u, v, w), a message M and a group signature
, compute the values
An Efficient Batch Verifier for BBS Group Signatures.
Computing R 3 is the most expensive part of the verification above, but at first glance it is not clear that this can be batched, because each R 3 is hashed in the verification equation. However, as described by Technique 1, the signature and the verification algorithm can be modified at the expense of increasing the signature size by one element. Let σ = (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , R 3 , c, s α , s β , s x , s γ 1 , s γ 2 ) be the new signature, together with:
New Individual Verify. Given a group public key gpk = (g 1 , g 2 , h, u, v, w), a message M and a group signature σ = (
Finally check if c
Accept if all checks succeed, else reject. Now we define a batch verifier, where the main objective is to use a constant number of pairings.
BBS Batch Verify. Let gpk = (g 1 , g 2 , h, u, v, w) be the group public key, and let
be the j'th signature on the message M j , for each j = 1, . . . , η. For each j = 1, . . . , η, compute the following values:
Now for each j = 1, . . . , η, check the following:
Then check the following single pairing based equation
where (δ 1 , . . . , δ η ) is a random vector of b bit elements from Z q . Accept if and only if all checks succeed.
Theorem 4.1 For security level b , the above algorithm is a batch verifier for the BBS group signature scheme, where the probability of accepting an invalid signature is 2 − b .
Proof sketch. Let gpk = (g 1 , g 2 , h, u, v, w) be the group public key, and let σ j = (T j,1 , T j,2 , T j,3 , R j,3 , c, s j,α , s j,β , s j,x , s j,γ 1 , s j,γ 2 ) be the j'th signature on the message M j , for each j = 1, . . . , η. Since the BBS Batch Verify algorithm performs the same tests as the New Individual Verify algorithm for each signature separately, we just need to prove that equation 2 is a batch verifier for equation 1. From Theorem 3.2, for any random vector (δ 1 , . . . , δ η ) of b bit elements from Z q , the following equation
is a batch verifier for the pairing based equation 1. It is easy to see that equation 3 is equivalent to equation 2. Indeed, equation 2 is an optimized version of equation 3 obtained by applying techniques 2 and 3.
2
The Boneh-Shacham (BS) Group Signatures As we point out in Figure 2 , the (even shorter) group signatures of Boneh and Shacham [10] can also be batch verified using techniques similar to those above. The BS scheme includes a feature known as verifier local revocation (VLR), which allows verifiers to discard signatures from revoked signers. Unfortunately, the checks required to test for revoked signers cannot easily be batched. Thus, our batch verifier omits them. Since VLR is not a "traditional" property of a group signature (e.g., [2, 6] ), the resulting batch verifier is still quite useful for applications where only a standard group signature is needed. Note that verifiers may still perform revocation checks using the non-batched verify algorithm and the group manager can still recover the signer's identity in case of misbehavior. An interesting open problem would be to create a group signature scheme that simultaneously supports both VLR and an efficient batch verification.
Performance and Signature Length. 
Ring and Identity-based Ring Signature Schemes
A ring signature scheme allows a signer to sign a message on behalf of a set of users which include the signer herself in such a way that a verifier is convinced that the signer is one of the ring members, but he cannot tell which member is the actual signer. A ring signature is a triple of algorithms KeyGen, Sign and Verify, that, respectively generate public and private keys for a user, sign a message on behalf of the ring and verify the signature on a message according to the ring. In an identity-based ring signature, a user can choose an arbitrary string, for example her email address, as her public key. The corresponding private key is then created by binding such a string which represents the user's identity with the master key of a trusted party called private key generator (PKG). Such a scheme consists of four algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, Sign and Verify. During Setup, the PKG sets the system parameters P pub and chooses a master secret key msk. During KeyGen, the PKG gives the user a secret key based on her identity string. Then the signing and verification algorithms operate as before, except that only P pub and the ring members identities are needed in place of their public keys. Figures 3 and 4 summarize the two schemes we consider and how to batch them, respectively. 2 The CYH scheme is fairly straightforward to batch, while the Boyen scheme required more creativity, especially in the application of techniques 3 and 4.
Scheme Setup Key Generation
Signature Verify Figure 3 : Ring signature schemes that we consider. We denote by P pub , sk and pk the system parameters, user private key and user public key, respectively. Moreover, we denote with pk i and sk i the public and private keys of the i-th user in the ring. A ring signature on a message M is denoted by σ and represents the ring size.
Scheme Batch Verification Precomputation Batch Verification Equation
Techniques
Figure 4: Batch verifier for the ring signature and ID-based ring signature schemes we consider. Let η be the number of signatures to verify and M j be the message corresponding to the j'th signature σ j . With pk j,i and j we denote the public key of the i'th ring member and the size of the ring associated to the j'th signature, respectively. The vector (δ 1 , . . . , δ η ) in Z q is required by the small exponents test.
Signature and Identity-based Signature Schemes
In this section, for completeness, we first review some previously known short signature schemes and their corresponding batch verifiers. In 2001, Boneh, Lynn and Shacham [9] proposed the first
CHP
Let Φ be the set of time periods. (q, g 1 , g 2 
= e(a, pk) · e(h, pk) b Figure 5 : Signature Schemes that we consider. We denote by pk and sk the public key and the private key of a user, respectively. We denote by σ a signature on a message M . In CHP, φ is a time period in the set of time periods Φ.
short pairing-based signature scheme which is secure against existential forgery under adaptive chosen message attack in the random oracle model. We'll refer to this scheme as BLS.
Scheme Batch Verification Precomputation Batch Verification Equation Techniques
= e(a,
Figure 6: Batch verifiers for the signature schemes we consider. Let η be the number of signatures to verify. With pk j we denote the public key of the user who issued the j'th signature. The vector (δ 1 , . . . , δ η ) in Z q is required by the small exponents test. In BLS, s is the number of different signer and n i is the number of signatures issued by the i'th signer (for details see the text). In CHP, φ is a time period in the set of time periods Φ.
As also noticed by the authors, BLS is suitable to verify a bunch of purported signatures either issued from the same signer on different messages or by different public keys on the same message in a faster way than simply verifying each signature separately. Indeed, consider η BLS signatures σ 1 , . . . , σ η issued by means of the BLS signature algorithm (see Figure 5 ) under the same public key pk on different messages M 1 . . . . , M η . According to the BLS verification equation (see Figure 5 ), 2η pairing evaluations are needed to verify each equation separately, while applying techniques 2 and 3, only two pairing evaluations suffice: e( η j=1 H(M j ) δ j , pk) = e( η j=1 σ δ j j , g 2 ), for some vector (δ 1 , . . . , δ η ) in Z q . In Figure 6 , we consider batching different messages from s different signers. Here BLS batch verification equation requires s + 1 pairing evaluations.
Camenisch, Hohenberger and Pedersen [13] proposed a signature scheme secure of the same size as BLS also secure in the random oracle model. We'll refer to this as CHP. This scheme allows
= e(S 1 · pk a , P pub ) Figure 7 : Identity-based signature schemes that we consider. We denote by msk, P pub , sk and pk the master key, the system parameters, user private key and user public key, respectively. We denote by σ a signature on a message M . In Waters, z is the number of -bit chunks. Moreover, the identity ID and the message M are parsed as κ 1 , . . . , κ z and m 1 , . . . , m z , respectively. efficient batch verification of signatures made by different signers provided that all signatures have been issued during the same period of time. Since the values g 2 , a and h are the same for all signatures, from techniques 2 and 3, the CHP batch verification equation shown in Figure 6 requires only three pairings.
In the following we focus on batch verification for identity-based signature schemes. An identity based signature scheme consists of four algorithms: Setup, Key Generation, Sign and Verify. The public key generator PKG initializes the system during the Setup phase by choosing the system parameters P pub which are made public. Moreover, the PKG chooses a master key msk and keeps it secret. The master key is used in the key generation phase along with the identity of a user to compute the user's private key. A user can sign a message by using the Sign algorithm. Finally, a verifier can check a signature on a message by using the Verify algorithm on input the signature, the public parameters and the identity of the signer. In Figure 7 we summarize the identity-based signature schemes we consider.
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Figure 8: Batch verifiers for the identity-based signature schemes we consider. Let η be the number of signatures to verify. With pk j we denote the public key of the user who issued the j'th signature σ j on message M j . The vector (δ 1 , . . . , δ η ) in Z q is required by the small exponents test. In CHP-2, z is the number of -bit chunks. Moreover, the identity ID j and the message M j corresponding to the j-th signature are parsed as κ j,1 , . . . , κ j,z and m j,1 , . . . , m j,z , respectively.
As shown in Figure 8 , techniques 2 and 3 allow to construct a batch verifier which requires only two pairing evaluations for the schemes ChCh and Hess. Both ChCh and Hess schemes are proved secure in the random oracle model. The ChCh batch verifier of Figure 8 was also shown in [24] . In [13] Camenisch et al. showed a batch verifier for an identity-based signature scheme secure in the standard model. This scheme, which we refer to as Waters, was originally proposed by Waters [38] , although we'll be using the optimizations to this scheme suggested in [30, 17] .
Aggregate Signatures
Aggregate signatures were introduced by Boneh, Lynn and Shacham [8] . An aggregate signature is a shorter representation of n signatures provided by different users on different messages. In particular, consider n signatures σ 1 , . . . , σ n on messages M 1 , . . . , M n issued by n users with public keys pk 1 , . . . , pk n . An aggregate signature scheme provides an aggregation algorithm, which can be run by anyone and outputs a compressed short signature σ on input all σ i , for i = 1, . . . , n. Moreover, there is a verification algorithm that on inputs the signature σ the public keys pk 1 , . . . , pk n and the messages M 1 , . . . , M n decides if σ is a valid aggregate signature. Figure 4 .4 reviews the aggregate signatures we consider. Sh scheme [37] requires the existence of a third party named aggregator who is responsible of aggregating signatures. LOSSW scheme [25] , proved to be secure in the standard model, is a sequential aggregate signature scheme. The aggregate signature must be constructed sequentially, with each signer adding its signature in turn. Figure 10 shows the corresponding batch verifier obtained by using our basic tools. Following the line of Theorem 4.1 it is easy to see that the pairing based equations in Figure 10 are batch verifiers for the corresponding schemes when all aggregate signatures are issued by the same set of users. 
be an aggregate so far on a set of messages {M 1 , . . . , M −1 } under public keys {pk 1 , . . . , pk −1 }. Let M be the message to sign under public key pk and corresponding secret key sk . We denote
Figure 9: For setup, key generation and signature of BGLS and Sh see Figure 5 . We denote by σ an aggregate signature on a set of messages M 1 , . . . , M . In LOSSW a message M i is processed as a k-bit string denoted by m i,1 , . . . , m i,k .
Implementation and Performance Analysis
The previous work on batching short signatures [13] considers only asymptotic performance. Unfortunately, this "paper analysis" conceals many details that are revealed only through empirical evaluation. Additionally, the existing work does not address how to handle invalid signatures. We seek to answer these questions by conducting the first empirical investigation into the feasibility of short signature batching. To conduct our experiments, we built concrete implementations of seven signature schemes described in this work, including two public key signature schemes (BLS, CHP), three Identity-Based Signature schemes (ChCh, Hess, Waters), a ring signature (CYH), and a short group signature scheme (BBS). For each scheme, we measured the performance of the individual verification algorithm against that of the corresponding batch verifier. We then turned our attention to the problem of efficiently sorting out invalid signatures.
Experimental Setup. To evaluate our batch verifiers, we implemented each signature scheme in C++ using the MIRACL library for elliptic curve operations [35] . Our timed experiments were Scheme Batch Verification Equation
Figure 10: Let η be the number of signatures to verify. The vector (δ 1 , . . . , δ η ) in Z q is required by the small exponents test. In LOSSW a message M j,i provided by pk i in the j'th aggregate is processed as a k-bit string denoted by m j,i,1 , . . . , m j,i,k .
conducted on a 3.0Ghz Pentium D 930 with 4GB of RAM running Linux Kernel 2.6. All hashing was implemented using SHA1, 4 and small exponents were of size 80 bits. For each scheme, our basic experiment followed the same outline: (1) generate a collection of η distinct signatures on 100-byte random message strings. (2) Conduct a timed verification of this collection using the batch verifier. (3) Repeat steps (1, 2) four times, averaging to obtain a mean timing. To obtain a view of batching efficiency on collections of increasing size, we conducted the preceding test for values of η ranging from 1 to approximately 400 signatures in intervals of 20. Finally, to provide a baseline, we separately measured the performance of the corresponding non-batched verification, by verifying 1000 signatures and dividing to obtain the average verification time per signature. A high-level summary of our results is presented in Figure 12 . Figure 11 : Description of the elliptic curve parameters used in our experiments. R(·) describes the approximate number of bits to optimally represent a group element. S RSA is an estimate of "RSA-equivalent" security derived via the approach of Page et al. [31] .
Curve Parameters. The selection of elliptic curve parameters impacts both signature size and verification time. The two most important choices are the size of the underlying finite field F p , and the curve's embedding degree k. Due to the MOV attack, security is bounded by the size of the associated finite field F p k . Simultaneously, the representation of elements G 1 requires approximately |p| bits. Thus, most of the literature on short signatures recommends choosing a relatively small With the exception of BLS, our experiments considered signatures generated by distinct signers.
p, and a curve with a high value of k. (For example, an MNT curve with |p| = 192 bits and k = 6 is thought to offer approximately the same level of security as 1152-bit RSA [31] .) The literature on short signatures focuses mainly on signature size rather than verification time, so it is easy to miss the fact that using such high-degree curves substantially increases the cost of a pairing operation, and thus verification time. To incorporate these effects into our results, we implemented our schemes using two high-degree (k = 6) MNT curves with |p| equal to 160 bits and 192 bits. For completeness, we also considered a |p|=512 bit supersingular curve with embeddeing degree k = 2, and a subgroup G 1 of size 2 160 . Figure 11 details the curve choices along with relevant details such as pairing time and "RSA-equivalent" security determined using the approach of Page et al. [31] .
Performance Results
Public-Key signatures. Figure 13 presents the results of our timing experiments for the publickey BLS and CHP verifiers. Because the BLS signature does not batch efficiently for messages created by distinct signers, we studied the combination suggested in [13] , where BLS is used for certificates which are created by a single master authority, and CHP is used to sign the actual messages under users' individual signing keys. Unfortunately, the CHP batch verifier appears to be quite costly in the recommended MNT curve setting. This outcome stems from the requirement that user public keys be in the G 2 subgroup. This necessitates expensive point operations in the curve defined over the extension field, which undoes some of the advantage gained by batching. However, batching still reduces the per-signature verification cost to as little as 1/3 to 1/4 that of individual verification.
Identity-Based signatures. Figure 14 gives our measurements for three IBS schemes: ChCh, Waters and Hess. (For comparison, we also present CHP signatures with BLS-signed public-key certificates.) In all experiments, we consider signatures generated by different signers. In contrast with regular signatures, the IBSes batch quite efficiently, at least when implemented in MNT curves. The Waters scheme offers strong performance for a scheme not dependent on random oracles. 5 In our implementation of Waters, we first apply a SHA1 to the message, and use the Waters hash parameter z = 5 which divides the resulting 160-bit digest into blocks of 32 bits (as in [30] ). Anonymous signatures. Figure 15 gives our results for two privacy-preserving signatures: the CYH ring signature and the modified BBS group signature. As is common with ring signatures, in CYH both the signature size and verification time grow linearly with the number of members in the ring. For our experiments we arbitrarily selected two cases: (1) where all signatures are formed under a 2-member ring (useful for applications such as lightweight email signing [1] ), and (2) where all signatures are formed using a 20-member ring. 6 In contrast, both the signature size and verification time of the BBS group signature are independent of the size of the group. This makes group signatures like BBS significantly more practical for applications such as vehicle communication networks, where the number of signers might be quite large.
Batch Verification and Invalid Signatures
In Section 3.3, we discuss techniques for dealing with invalid signatures. When batch verification fails, this divide-and-conquer approach recursively applies the batch verifier to individual halves of the batch, until all invalid invalid signatures have been located. To save time when recursing, we compute products of the form
i so that partial products will be in place for each subset on which me might recurse. We accomplish this by placing each x δ i i at the leaf of a binary tree and caching intermediate products at each level. This requires no additional computation, and total storage of approximately 2η group elements for each product to be computed.
To evaluate the feasibility of this technique, we used it to implement a "resilient" batch verifier for the BLS signature scheme. This verifier accepts as input a collection of signatures where some larger parameters in order to achieve security comparable to alternative schemes. 6 Although the CYH batch verifier can easily batch signatures formed over differently-sized rings, our experiments use a constant ring size. Our results are representative of any signature collection where the mean ring size is 20. may be invalid, and outputs the index of each invalid signature found. To evaluate batching performance, we first generated a collection of 1024 valid signatures, and then randomly corrupted an r-fraction by replacing them with random group elements. We repeated this experiment for values of r ranging from 0 to 15% of the collection, collecting multiple timings at each point, and averaging to obtain a mean verification time. The results are presented in Figure 16 .
Batched verification of BLS signatures is preferable to the naïve individual verification algorithm even as the number of invalid signatures exceeds 10% of the total batch size. The random distribution of invalid signatures within the collection is nearly the worst-case for resilient verification. In practice, invalid signatures might be grouped together within the batch (e.g., if corruption is due to a burst of EM interference). In this case, the verifier might achieve better results by omitting the random shuffle step or using another re-ordering technique.
Conclusion
Our experiments provide strong evidence that batching short signatures is practical, even in a setting where an adversary can inject invalid signatures. Our results apply to standard and Identity-Based signatures, as well as to the more exotic short ring and group signatures which are increasingly being considered for privacy-critical applications. Figure 16 : BLS batch verification in the presence of invalid signatures (160-bit MNT curve). A "resilient" BLS batch verifier was applied to a collection of 1024 purported BLS signatures, where some percentage were randomly corrupted. Per-signature times were computed by dividing the total verification time (including identification of invalid signatures) by the total number of signatures (1024), and averaging over multiple experimental runs. ficient batching depends heavily on the underlying design of a signature scheme, particularly on the placement of elements within the elliptic curve subgroups. For example, the CHP signature and the ChCh IBS have comparable size and security, yet the latter scheme can batch more than 250 signatures per second (each from a different signer), while our CHP implementation clocks in at fewer than 40. We believe that scheme designers should take these considerations into account when proposing new pairing-based signature schemes.
A Proof of the Small Exponents Test
Proof. It is easy to see that if A = Y (j) holds for all j ∈ [1, η], then η j=1 A δ j = η j=1 Y (j) δ j holds for any random vector ∆ = (δ 1 , . . . , δ η ). We must now show the other direction, that if Batch outputs accept, then A = Y (j) holds for all j ∈ [1, η] except with probability at most 2 − b . Since A and Y (j) are in G T , we can write A = e(g, g) a and Y (j) = e(g, g) y (j) for some a, y (j) ∈ Z q . The batch verification equation can then be written as η j=1 e(g, g) a = η j=1 e(g, g) y (j) ⇒ e(g, g) P η j=1 a = e(g, g) P η j=1 y (j)
. Now define β j = a − y (j) . Since Batch accepts it must be true that η j=1 β j δ j ≡ 0 (mod q)
Now assume that at least one of the individual equations do not hold. We assume without loss of generality that this is true for equation j = 1. This means that β 1 = 0. Since q is a prime then β 1 has an inverse γ 1 such that β 1 γ 1 ≡ 1 (mod q). This and Equation 4 gives us
Let event E occurs if A = Y (1) , but Batch accepts. Note that we do not make any assumptions about the remaining values. Let ∆ = δ 2 , . . . , δ η denote the last η − 1 values of ∆ and let |∆ | be the number of possible values for this vector. Equation 5 says that given a fixed vector ∆ there is exactly one value of δ 1 that will make event E happen, or in other words that the probability of E given a randomly chosen 
